Socialist growth revisited: insights from Yugoslavia by Kukić, Leonard
  
 
 
Economic History Working Papers 
 
 
No: 268/2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic History Department, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London,  
WC2A 2AE, London, UK. T: +44 (0) 20 7955 7084. F: +44 (0) 20 7955 7730 
  
 
Socialist Growth Revisited: 
Insights from Yugoslavia 
Leonard Kukić 
London School of Economics 
 
 
 
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC HISTORY  
WORKING PAPERS  
NO. 268 – OCTOBER 2017 
 
Socialist Growth Revisited: 
Insights from Yugoslavia1 
 
 
Leonard Kukić 
London School of Economics, Department of Economic History 
e-mail: L.Kukic@lse.ac.uk 
 
 
Abstract 
Beyond the recent past, and beyond the Soviet Union, we know little about the performance of Eastern 
European economies. This paper fills the knowledge void by analyzing socialist Yugoslavia using a diagnostic 
tool that identifies the mechanisms that drive economic growth - business cycle accounting. The analysis 
provides novel findings. During the “Golden Age" of economic growth, total factor productivity became 
gradually more important in sustaining economic growth. Distorted labour incentives were a major constraint 
on growth since the mid-1960s, and explain the slowdown of the economy during the 1980s. Socialist growth 
was primarily handicapped by poor incentives to work, rather than by poor incentives to innovate or to 
imitate. In an attempt to liberalise the economy, economic power was delegated to the labour-managed firms. 
These firms were maximising income per worker, which I hypothesise hindered the ability of Yugoslavs to 
work. 
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1 Introduction
Socialism was the greatest social, political and economic experiment of the twentieth century.
Yet, beyond the Soviet Union and China, economists and historians largely neglect the perfor-
mance of socialist economies. This is all the more surprising given the lessons these economies
can provide to the perennial debates about the viability of state-led development strategies.
Yugoslavia is, perhaps, the most peculiar case from which we can learn about the economics of
socialism. Yugoslavia was the fastest growing socialist economy in the post-WWII era (Sapir,
1980). In fact, it was one of the fastest growing countries in Europe during the 1950s and
the 1960s (Balassa and Bertrand, 1970). Socialism is mostly associated with central planning.
Yugoslavia was, however, heralded by contemporaries as a template for market socialism and
democratic socialism. To many it symbolized the “third way” between central planning and
the market economy. Thus, Horvat (1971) attributed Yugoslavia’s growth performance to its
labour-managed firm and to its decentralised socialist system that relied on market forces to a
greater extent that did other socialist systems. But, the Yugoslavian socialist engine eventually
ran out of steam, with economic growth coming to a standstill during the 1980s. Subsequently,
the country disintegrated. The aim of this article is to determine the sources of Yugoslavia’s
economic growth during the post-war period, while focusing on the causes of its growth slow-
down.
How can one account for the episodes of success and failure in an economy? Growth account-
ing is a useful tool to depict the development trajectory of an economy over time. But, since
growth accounting focuses only on the supply side, it cannot provide an explanation for the evo-
lution of capital, labour, and total factor productivity (TFP). I use an alternative methodology,
namely business cycle accounting (BCA) methodology that preserves an accounting purpose,
but moves towards the direction of explanations. BCA, developed by Cole and Ohanian (2002)
and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), is a based on a standard neoclassical growth model,
but includes “wedges”. These wedges measure the deviations of an economy from the perfectly
competitive market economy in the domains of labour, capital, TFP, and demand. The wedges
measure distortions or incentives that firms and households face.
This paper presents two key findings. First, until the 1980s, the rate of TFP growth was
roughly constant. Since the growth rate of output per capita gradually declined, the share of
economic growth due to TFP increased. During this period, TFP was likely driven by structural
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change, possibly by efficiency gains stemming from the gradual integration of Yugoslavia into the
global economy, and possibly by the increased adoption rate of technology. Even though TFP
did decrease towards the end of the 1980s, it did not drive growth retardation of the 1980s.
These findings are consistent with the notion that, in its early stages, growth is primarily
associated with capital accumulation, while TFP becomes more important in later stages of
growth (Collins and Bosworth, 1996; Iacopetta, 2010). These findings, however, contradict
most of previous research on socialist countries. Existing growth accounts of planned economies
typically find a declining rate of TFP growth, and in the 1980s often negative TFP growth
(Ofer, 1987; Bergson, 1989; van Ark, 1996; Allen, 2003). The findings of this paper are instead
similar to the recent revisionist literature that challenges this view. Using downwardly revised
investment data, Vonyo´ and Klein (2017) find higher TFP growth rates in socialist European
economies compared to other existing studies.1
Second, the labour wedge is quantitatively the most important determinant of the retar-
dation of Yugoslavia’s economic growth. The labour wedge corresponds to the discrepancy
between the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, and the marginal
product of labour. The labour wedge is related to the structure of incentives determining the
provision of labour. It is often interpreted as synonymous with the distortive effect caused by
labour taxation. The labour wedge embarked on a steady worsening trend since 1965. This
coincides with the 1965 socio-economic reforms. These reforms allowed the work councils of
labour-managed firms to distribute income between wages and investment. I argue that this
allowed labour-managed firms to approach their governing objective of maximising income per
worker, distorting the ability of Yugoslavs to provide labour. Through restricting new labour
entry, the already employed workers gained at the cost of the outsiders. Along the lines of
theory of distributional coalitions capturing rents by Olson (1982), the work councils of labour-
managed firms obstructed efficient allocation of labour. The opening of borders compounded
the macroeconomic implication of distorted labour incentive. With increasing domestic unem-
ployment, a large fraction of Yugoslavs responded by emigrating, draining the domestic supply
of labour.
This paper contributes to the literature on socialist economic growth. By focusing on Yu-
1Other revisionist literature tends to stress the neglected factors in the existing literature on socialist eco-
nomic growth. For instance, Vonyo´ (2017) argues that the relative underperformance of socialist European
economies compared to the Western market economies was largely caused by labour supply inflexibility induced
by comparatively larger WWII population loses.
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goslavia, I move past the overwhelming focus of literature on the economic performance of
the Soviet Union. The existing literature uses two analytical models to explain the decline
and failure of socialist economies. Under a Cobb-Douglas production function with unit fac-
tor substitution, the (comparative) decline is attributed to the (comparative) decline of TFP
growth (Bergson, 1979, 1983, 1987a, 1989; Gomulka, 1977; Desai and Martin, 1983; Allen, 2003;
Broadberry and Klein, 2011). Under a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production func-
tion with low elasticity of factor substitution, the decline is attributed to diminishing marginal
product of capital (MPK) (Weitzman, 1970; Desai, 1976; Sapir, 1980; Rusek, 1980; Easterly and
Fischer, 1995). I contribute to this strand of literature by providing an alternative explanation
for Yugoslavia’s output retardation. I argue that labour constraints were the most important
relative contributor to Yugoslavia’s growth retardation.2 This does not mean that declining
TFP and declining MPK are irrelevant explanations. TFP certainly did not boost economic
growth during the 1980s, and Yugoslavia did encounter diminishing MPK since the early 1960s.
However, relative to the labour wedge, these factors were of second-order importance.
The limitation of the aforementioned debate is that it does not move past what Maddison
(1988) calls the “proximate” sources of growth. The inability of Eastern European countries
to converge towards income levels of their market-oriented neighbours is attributed to the em-
bedded inefficiencies of socialist economies (Kornai, 1980). Incentives for innovation were poor
(Berliner, 1976), labour was demoralized (Ofer, 1987), and the system was unable to adapt to the
requirements of flexible production technology (Broadberry and Klein, 2011). Thus, Krugman
(1994) argues that socialist economies were bound to fail. I contribute to this strand of litera-
ture that focuses on what Maddison (1988) calls the “ultimate” sources of growth by analysing
the impact of the labour-managed firm on the incentive to provide labour. If Yugoslavia was
characterized by embedded disincentives that caused its failure, these poor incentives were not
primarily related to incentives to innovate or imitate, but rather related to the incentives to
work.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the evolution of
the Yugoslav economic system. Section 3 defines the model, it specifies the used wedges, and
it discusses the BCA procedure and related assumptions. Section 4 describes the data sources
2My explanation of Yugoslavia’s slowdown can be perceived as intermediate one between the TFP decline
and diminishing MPK. Constrained labour input implies a low rate of labour utilization. If not accounted for,
low factor utilization is reflected in low TFP. I argue that labour was the binding factor on growth, which is
somewhat implied by the articles that focus on role of diminishing MPK.
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and parameters. Sections 5 and 6 present the results. Here, I provide detailed interpretation(s)
concerning the evolution of each wedge. Finally, section 7 provides a conclusion, and includes
remarks on the significance of the Yugoslav experience for wider developmental concerns.
2 Historical context
The strong anti-fascist resistance movement, led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY)
and its leader, Tito, was able to assert political power after the end of WWII. The CPY did
not face significant political opposition in the immediate post-war period. It was backed, to an
extent, by genuine popular support (Lampe, 2000). The fight against the Axis powers and their
domestic collaborators legitimated it.
The evolution of the socialist economic system in Yugoslavia can be divided into four phases
that can be perceived as a gradual move from central planning through market socialism to
decentralised planning. The first period, during 1945-51, was characterized by rigid central
planning stressing heavy industrialisation along the development model set by the Soviet Union
(Horvat, 1971).
The split between the Yugoslav president Tito and the Soviet leader Stalin in 1948 was a
pivotal moment in Yugoslav history.3 Yugoslav authorities initially attempted to regain Stalin’s
favour. As rapprochement with the Soviet Union turned impossible while Stalin lived, Yugoslav
officials sought to distance themselves from the Soviet Union and its ideology. They started
constructing a unique version of socialism. This period marks the second phase of development
that lasted until 1965. Collectivisation and binding output targets were abandoned, as well
as the most egregious price distortions. A substantial degree of decision-making power was
delegated to enterprises (Prout, 1985). Firms became labour-managed, or organized along the
principles of self-management. Work councils, supposedly representing the interests of workers,
could, in conjunction with the local government, hire and fire the managers of the enterprise.
Moreover, they could decide, to a degree, on marketing and production processes of an enterprise
(Horvat, 1971).
Even though economic decision-making power was substantially decentralised, the Federal
authorities still possessed effective control over the economy through the General Investment
Fund. The creation of the Fund during the early 1950s replaced direct budget transfers as a
3See Rajak (2011) for the description of the episode.
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Figure 1: Trade (exports and imports) as percentage of GDP (1990 Int. GK$), and composition
of trade, Yugoslavia, 1952-89
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Statistiku, 1989) and Statisticˇki Godissˇnjak SFR Jugoslavije (SGJ) (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1991),
and composition of trade is taken from OECD (1965, 1990)
main source of investment finance. The Fund centralised capital, which was then allocated to
firms that either promised highest returns in investment auctions, or were deemed worthy of
investment for political reasons (Bicˇanic´, 1973).
During the 1950s, Yugoslavia began gradually opening up to the West. Figure 1.b illustrates
that Yugoslavia conducted most of its trade with the OECD countries. This is not to say that
Yugoslavia was particularly open to the West, or to the wider global economy. Its share of total
trade as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP, 1990 Int. GK$) remained at relatively
low levels during the 1950s (figure 1.a). Nevertheless, Yugoslav trade with both the OECD club
and the Socialist Bloc gradually increased (figure 1.a).
The economic reform of 1965 opened the third phase of development that lasted until 1974.
It was a heyday of market socialism. Yugoslavia joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) in 1966. Figure 1.a shows that the entrance into the GATT coincides with a
strong increase in Yugoslav trade with the OECD countries. In addition to this, market forces
were strengthened through a liberalisation of prices, and through allowing enterprises to engage
freely in foreign trade. Crucially, work councils of labour-managed firms were granted almost
complete autonomy over the distribution of net income between further investment and higher
5
wages. Furthermore, the previous fixed charge on the usage of capital by firms (it was a cost
on capital in the absence of capital markets) designed to finance the General Investment Fund
was scrapped. Banks became the primary financial intermediary, as opposed to the General
Investment Fund in the previous period. Banks were intended to be the institutional channel
through which scarce resources would be allocated to their most productive use. In effect, banks
were subsidizing capital, and formed the soft budget constraint that firms faced (Prout, 1985;
Uvalic´, 1992). That is, along the lines of the theory of soft budget constraint formulated by
Kornai (1979, 1980), firms had assured access to credit. Poorly performing firms were rarely
denied credit (Prout, 1985; Uvalic´, 1992).
One of the main aims of the economic reforms of 1965 was to increase the plough-back
of profits into the enterprises through decreased taxation of enterprise revenues. The aim
was to increase the real return on investment by incentivising firms to strengthen their risk-
assessment capabilities. The total share of enterprise self-financing of fixed investment increased
substantially from 28 per cent in 1965, to over 50 per cent in 1966 (Uvalic´, 1992).
Since unemployment increased, a 1966 government bill opened Yugoslav borders to all
labourers who wished to work abroad. Yugoslavs responded en masse. By 1981, approximately
10 per cent of labour moved to the West, primarily West Germany (Lampe, 2000).
The 1974 constitution further decentralised economic power. This ushered in the last phase
of the economic system that lasted until the implosion of the country in 1991. Economic power
was decentralised to departmental level within firms. Decentralisation of this type, however,
did not make the economy more market oriented. On the contrary, it was a period of de-
liberalisation. The 1974 constitution institutionalised the backlash of political elites against the
increasingly independent managers. The economy became clogged with overregulation operated
by overlapping authorities that formalized the relationship between the departments within a
firm, between firms within a sector, between the sectors, and so on. Pejovich (1980) called
this a system of contractual self-management that led to an increase in transaction costs and
efficiency loss in the transmission of market information.
3 Methodology
BCA methodology is based on the standard Ramsay-Cass-Koopmans growth model, but in-
cludes wedges. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) and Brinca, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrat-
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tan (2016) argue that a large set of dynamic general equilibrium models are equivalent to a
prototype neoclassical growth model embodying wedges in the first order conditions. BCA
identifies the evolution of incentives (wedges) that firms and households face. The wedges can
be thought of as shocks that influence decisions of economic agents. They together drive the
overall economic growth. I use the labor wedge, capital wedge, income wedge, and efficiency
wedge (TFP), and describe them below.
3.1 Prototype Ramsay-Cass-Koopmans model
The infinitely lived representative household derives utility at period t from per capita con-
sumption (ct) and leisure (1− lt):
∞∑
t=0
βtNt[log(ct) + φlog(1− lt)] (1)
where Nt denotes the working age population, and φ is the coefficient for leisure. The household
discounts consumption and leisure with the factor β.
The representative firm is characterized by the Cobb-Douglas production function as in Hall
and Jones (1999):
Yt = K
θ
t (xthtLt)
1−θ (2)
where Yt denotes output, which is a function physical capital (Kt), labour augmenting tech-
nological progress (xt), human capital per worker (ht), and labour (Lt). θ is the elasticity of
output with respect to physical capital. Assuming constant returns scale, 1− θ is the elasticity
of output with respect to labour augmented by quality (xthtLt). All the components of output
are determined outside the model, except physical capital, which is characterized by the usual
law of motion:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (3)
where δ is the depreciation rate, and It denotes gross investment.
In addition to the production function in equation 2, the equilibrium of a prototype neo-
classical growth model is characterized by the following three equations:
(1− θ)yt
lt
=
φct
(1− lt) (4)
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(1 + γ)ct+1
ctβ
= 1 + θ
yt+1
kt+1
− δ (5)
ct + it = yt (6)
where Yt, It, and Kt are expressed in per capita terms as yt, it, and kt, respectively. γ is the
growth rate of labour augmenting technological progress. The household’s first order condition
in equation 4 states that the marginal product of labour (left-hand side) should be equal to
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure (right-hand side). It deter-
mines the equilibrium condition for the supply of labour. Equation 5 defines the growth rate
of consumption, by specifying that the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (left-hand
side) should be equal to the cross-period return on investment (right-hand side).4 Equation
6 describes the resource constraint of the economy, by specifying that the total income of the
economy (right-hand side) is spent on either consumption or investment (left-hand side).
3.2 Wedges
The rationale of BCA rests on the observation that, in real economies, the terms on the sides of
equation 2, and of equations 4-6, tend to be different. These differences are regarded as wedges.
These wedges measure the distortions that economic agents face.
The efficiency wedge, or TFP, measures the efficiency with which inputs are transformed
into output. As in real business cycle models, the TFP wedge is measured as the deviation
around the constant growth rate of labour-augmenting technological progress (γ), or balanced-
growth path. The model thus focuses on the accelerations or decelerations of growth around
the balanced-growth path. Formally, TFP is based on equation 2, and is defined as:
zt =
yt
kθt (xthtlt)
1−θ (7)
The labour wedge measure the discrepancy between the marginal rate of substitution of con-
sumption for leisure, and the marginal product of labour. Incentives that drive the supply of
labour to deviate from the level implied by equation 4 are reflected in the labour wedge (1−τl,t):
4I assume that economic agents have perfect foresight.
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1− τl,t =
φct
(1−lt)
(1−θ)yt
lt
(8)
The labour wedge is related to the structure of incentives that determine the supply of labour.
A rising labour wedge can be interpreted as rising return on labour that stimulates the provision
of labour. The labour wedge is often interpreted as synonymous with the distortive effect caused
by labour taxation (Prescott, 2004; Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2007; Ohanian, Raffo, and
Rogerson, 2008). As such, a deteriorating labour wedge can be interpreted as a distortion arising
due to increased taxation of labour - e.g. due to increased income taxation. For instance, if the
marginal product of labour increases and the marginal rate of substitution remains constant,
the labour wedge will deteriorate. Households are not receiving the proceeds of their product
in the form of higher consumption or leisure. Following the tax analogy, this is equivalent to
being taxed more.
The capital wedge measures the frictions that distort the intertemporal Euler equation,
which specifies the trade-off between current and future consumption. Incentives that drive
investments to deviate from the level implied by equation 5 are reflected in the capital wedge
(1− τk,t+1):
1− τk,t+1 =
(1+γ)ct+1
ctβ
1 + θyt+1kt+1 − δ
(9)
The capital wedge is related to the structure of incentives determining saving and investment.
An increasing capital wedge can be interpreted as an increasing return on capital that stimulates
saving and investment. Analogous to the labour wedge, a capital wedge is often interpreted as
synonymous with the distortive effect caused by taxation of capital. For instance, if the cross-
period return on investment increases, given the intertemporal rate of substitution, the capital
wedge will deteriorate. Households are undersaving because, following the tax analogy, the tax
rate has increased.
The income wedge measures the discrepancy between output and domestic private demand
- composed of consumption and investments - in equation 6. This discrepancy measures the
expenditure gap in order for the resource constraint to hold. The income wedge (τi,t) measures
output appropriated by the government and the foreign sector:
τi,t = yt − ct − it (10)
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The main limitation of BCA is that the measured wedges do not interact (Christiano and
Davis, 2006). Each wedge evolves independently of the others, neglecting possible spillover
effects. Furthermore, in order to understand the exact incentives that, say, increase the return
on the supply of labour, a researcher should specify explicit mechanisms. This is not necessarily
a weakness. A model with detailed mechanisms a priori assumes the importance of the same
mechanisms, which might not be the case. BCA remains agnostic ex ante about important
channels that drive macroeconomic fluctuations. It provides diagnostic results without assuming
which factor may or may not be an important source of growth. BCA may thus be applied to a
variety of countries in a variety of time periods. Finally, BCA cannot explain the evolution of
TFP because it is not an endogenous growth model. In that sense, it shares a common problem
with growth accounting. Relating the empirical findings to the existing literature on Yugoslav
macroeconomic history can alleviate some of the aforementioned issues.
3.3 Fundamental assumptions
Implied profit-maximization is a poor description of firm behaviour within a socialist economy.
BCA, however, can be applied to socialist economies. Cheremukhin, Golosov, Guriev, and
Tsyvinski (2015, 2017) use an extended BCA framework to analyse the economic growth of
socialist China and Soviet Union, respectively. Cheremukhin, Golosov, Guriev, and Tsyvinski
(2017) provide a detailed description of how some frictions related to Soviet Union map into a
neoclassical growth model characterized by wedges. A socialist economy can thus be perceived
as a distorted version (embodied by wedges) of a perfectly competitive economy. If anything, the
more liberal system of Yugoslav market socialism might be more suitable for BCA application
than the more rigid socialist systems like Stalin’s Soviet Union and Mao’s China.
Turning to the production function, the Cobb-Douglas assumption of unit substitution be-
tween capital and labour might be wrong. Weitzman (1970) argues that the Soviet economy is
better represented by CES production function with factor substitution below one. The impli-
cation of low factor substitution is that the Cobb-Douglass production function fails to register
the true extent of diminishing MPK. It thus underestimates the contribution of TFP to growth.
If this is true, my findings would be strengthened. The finding concerning the increasing im-
portance of TFP in sustaining growth would be strengthened, since TFP would gain a greater
weight as a source of growth. The deterioration of the labour wedge since the mid-1960s would
be even more pronounced because labour would gain a greater weight as a constraining factor
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of growth.
4 Data and calibration
4.1 Output and inputs
The period of analysis is between 1952 and 1989. The data this paper relies on is derived
from both official and alternative sources. The aim is to maximise the quality of data. All
value figures are converted into 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. This section briefly
describes used data concerning Yugoslavia. A detailed analysis is provided in appendix A.1. For
context, I include additional countries in the analysis. The data sources for these countries are
reserved for the data appendix, too (A.2). U.S. is included since it remains at the technological
frontier. Greece, Portugal, and Spain are included since they were at a broadly similar level
of development as Yugoslavia. Like Yugoslavia, these southern European countries were also
partially planned economies under autocratic regimes. I do not include other socialist economies
because the available data is not reliable.
I use GDP series from Maddison (online).5 Annual employment data is taken from official
sources.6 Workers employed in private farming are reported only in population censuses (1948,
1953, 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991).7 For the remaining years of the analysis, agricultural labour
is estimated through cubic interpolation. Labour is adjusted for hours worked from official
sources.8 Annual labour (total hours worked) is de-trended by 3600 hours, since the representa-
tive household spends a portion of the annual time endowment satisfying biological necessities
(like sleeping).
Human capital is constructed following the method of Hall and Jones (1999). Average years
of schooling are turned into mincerian human capital by adjusting for the income returns to
education relative to labour without education. Return to education is assumed to be piecewise
linear. The return to education under 4 years of schooling is taken to be 13.4 per cent, between
4 and 8 years of schooling it is taken to be 10.1 per cent, and above 8 years of schooling it is
taken to be 6.8 per cent. Years of schooling are based on Yugoslav population censuses. They
5Consumption series, however, are taken from official sources, since alternative long-run series are unavailable
(SGJ, (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1991)).
6SGJ (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1991).
7Popis Stanovniˇstva (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1948, 1953, 1961, 1971, 1981) and International Labor
Organization (ILO) for 1991 (online).
8SGJ (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1952-1991).
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are taken from Kukic´ (2017).
For gross investment, I use official data, but exclude an investment category “other”.9 I
omit this category because, among other factors, it includes expenditure on product research
and training of personnel, which is not part of physical capital. The exclusion of the category
other reduces gross investment by approximately 10 per cent on an average annual basis. Gross
investment is disaggregated into three components - equipment, residential structures, and non-
residential structures. Finally, I initialise capital stock series by using existing national wealth
estimates.10
Some of Yugoslavia’s macroeconomic data, within context, is provided in figure 2. The oil
shock of 1979 seems to be associated with the deterioration of most macroeconomic variables
(GDP per capita, capital to labour ratio, and investment to output ratio). By contrast, labour
to the working-age population ratio, indicating labour utilisation rate, gradually deteriorated
since the mid-1960s.
4.2 Parameters
The discount factor (β) is assumed to be 0.95, and the coefficient for leisure (φ) is taken to be
2. Similar assumptions are made in articles that use the same or similar methodology, and that
analyse economic growth of countries at a similar level of development (Lu, 2012; Cheremukhin,
Golosov, Guriev, and Tsyvinski, 2015, 2017). It is possible to estimate these parameters from
the data, albeit with subjective assumptions. The estimation of these parameters is reported
in appendix A.3.2. The choice of the discount factor and coefficient for leisure does not affect
the results.
Assuming perfectly competitive markets, the elasticity of output with respect to capital (θ)
is the capital share of income. I assume that θ is 0.4. This is similar to the often estimated
capital share of income in socialist countries (Easterly and Fischer, 1995). The remaining
parameters are estimated from the data. Population growth rate (υt) is time varying, and is on
average 1.1 per cent per annum. The growth rate of labour-augmenting technological progress
(γ) is 1.1 per cent, which is the average annual growth rate of labour-augmenting technological
9Investicije u Osnovna Sredstva SFR Jugoslavije, Socijalisticˇkih Republika i Socijalisticˇkih Autonomnih Pokra-
jina, 1952-1981, u Cenama 1972 (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1983a) and Investicije (Savezni Zavod za Statis-
tiku, 1982-1989).
10Equipment and non-residential structures are taken from the official survey of fixed assets: Osnovna Sredstva
Privrede Drusˇtvenog Sektora SFR Jugoslavije, Socijalisticˇkih Republika i Socijalisticˇkih Autonomnih Pokrajina,
1952-1981, u cenama 1972 (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1983b). Residential structures are taken from Vinski
(1978).
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Figure 2: Macroeconomic data, Yugoslavia and sample countries, 1952-89
Year
1952 1960 1970 1980 1989
1
9
9
0
 I
n
t.
 G
K
$
, 
in
 t
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
s
, 
lo
g
 s
c
a
le
2
5
10
20
30
40
Panel a: GDP per capita
Year
1952 1960 1970 1980 1989
1
9
9
0
 I
n
t.
 G
K
$
, 
lo
g
 s
c
a
le
2
5
10
30
50
70
90
Panel b: Capital to labour ratio
Year
1952 1960 1970 1980 1989
R
a
ti
o
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Panel c: Investment to output ratio
Year
1952 1960 1970 1980 1989
R
a
ti
o
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Panel d: Labour to working-age population ratio
Yugoslavia Greece Portugal Spain U.S.
Notes: Capita is defined as working-age person (15-64) through the text. Labour is total hours worked.
progress during 1952-89. The depreciation rate (δ) is 15 per cent for equipment, 3.1 per cent for
non-residential structures, and 1.3 per cent for residential structures. These depreciation rates
are taken from Hulten and Wykoff (1981) depreciation rate estimates by asset type.
5 Results: The evolution and interpretation of wedges
Figure 3 depicts the evolution of Yugoslav wedges within context. The evolution of wedges
is the cornerstone of the analysis because the growth rates are robust to a variety of assump-
tions and specifications, while the levels are not (see appendix A.3). In this section, I provide
interpretation for the evolution of each wedge.
5.1 TFP
Between 1952 and 1989 Yugoslav TFP grew by 1.8 per cent on an average annual basis
(figure 3.a). Table 1 compares this estimate to the TFP estimates in the existing literature.
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Figure 3: Yugoslav and sample-countries wedges, 1952-89
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Notes: The increase in any wedge is beneficial to economic growth. However, with the exception of
TFP, an increase in the wedge does not necessarily imply that its contribution to economic growth is
overall positive. It may be that the impact of a wedge on economic growth is actually negative. But, as
the wedge increases, its impact on economic growth will be less damaging and, in that sense, it will be
beneficial to economic growth. Business cycles are removed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (smoothing
parameter = 6.25). No technological growth rate is imposed (γ = 0), rendering TFP growth comparable
to standard growth accounting exercises.
Measured TFP gains of this paper, as a share of output growth, fall within the mid-range of
findings.
Yugoslav TFP grew faster than the U.S. TFP. This implies that Yugoslavia converged to-
wards the global technological frontier. It seems that TFP in Yugoslavia grew at a similar rate
as in Portugal, but slower than in Greece and Spain. The evolution of Yugoslav TFP can be
divided into two periods - before and after the second oil shock in 1979. Before 1979, Yugoslav
TFP grew rapidly. It stagnated afterwards, and decreased towards the end of the 1980s.
The literature provides a set of viable interpretations underlying the evolution of TFP.
Nishimizu and Page (1982) analyse Yugoslav TFP between 1965 and 1978. They find that
the evolution of TFP was driven by efficiency, rather than by technology. This is consistent
with Hsieh and Klenow (2009), who argue that the efficiency of resource allocation is a major
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Table 1: Yugoslav TFP growth in the literature
Share of output growth due to TFP Period Sector Capital share
This paper 46% 1952-89 Aggregate 0.4
Balassa and Bertrand (1970) 40% 1953-65 Manufacturing 0.65
Horvat (1971) 43% 1954-67 Manufacturing n.a.
Jerome (1985) 26% 1950-80 Aggregate n.a.
Kukic´ (2017) 32% 1953-86 Aggregate 0.43
Sapir (1980) 43% 1955-74 Manufacturing 0.13-0.28
Simon (2013) 55% 1953-89 Aggregate 0.29
Notes: Horvat (1971) estimated TFP gains in manufacturing, construction, and crafts. The capital share
of income in Sapir (1980) is time-varying. These estimates are imperfectly comparable due to differences in
analysed periods, sectors, and used capital shares.
component of TFP.
Improvements in resource allocation might have been driven by reconstruction dynamics.
Vonyo´ (2008) argues that, for core Western countries, the intensity and variety of economic
growth during the 1950s and the 1960s can be mostly explained by post-war reconstruction.
Post-war reconstruction might matter for socialist European countries as well. Vonyo´ (2010)
finds that post-war reconstruction drove the growth dynamics of Hungary during the 1950s
and the 1960s. Unfortunately, the quantitative contribution of reconstruction to Yugoslavia’s
growth is impossible to measure. Reliable macroeconomic aggregates are not available for the
interwar and the immediate post-war period. It is difficult to speculate about the extent to
which reconstruction efforts might have mattered.
Yugoslavia was overwhelmingly agricultural in the aftermath of World War II. But, it expe-
rienced rapid structural modernisation during the post-war period.11 Reallocation of resources
from low productivity agriculture to high productivity manufacturing and modern services cer-
tainly stimulated TFP.12 Table 2 demonstrates that the sectorial labour product gap declined
rapidly between 1953 and 1986. The reduction of the marginal quality-adjusted labour product
gap is strongly indicative of efficiency gains associated with a process of structural moderniza-
tion (column 2 of table 2) (Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi, 2014). Moreover, it seems
that TFP gains during the 1970s were sustained partially by structural modernisation, since
11According to official statistics, agricultural workers formed 74 per cent of total workforce in 1952. By 1989,
agricultural workers formed 19 per cent of total workforce.
12As in other socialist economies, policy-makers attempted to stimulate structural modernization by relative
price distortions. Prices of agricultural goods were set below world prices, while prices of industrial goods were
set above world prices. Allen (2003) argues that such policies were conducive to the expansion of industry and
aggregate output of the Soviet Union. This price distortion was gradually alleviated in Yugoslavia. According to
official data, I find that the annual inflation rate of agricultural goods was on average 2 percentage points higher
than that of non-agricultural goods during 1952-86 (Jugoslavija 1918-1988 Statisticcˇki Godiˇsnjak, (Savezni Zavod
za Statistiku, 1989)).
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Table 2: Relative productivity of non-agriculture and agriculture, Yugoslavia, 1953-86
Ratio of non-agricultural to agricul-
tural labour productivity
Ratio of non-agricultural to agricul-
tural MPH
1953 4.365406 1.959573
1961 3.511758 1.610309
1971 3.074353 1.453791
1981 1.855458 0.959013
1986 1.643827 0.857754
Notes: The marginal product of human capital (MPH) is the derivative of output with
respect to labour augmented by human capital. Physical capital in agriculture includes
the value of land and livestock.
Source: Sectorial level data is taken from Kukic´ (2017).
the reduction of the marginal product gap accelerated.13
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that structural modernisation is sufficient in explaining the
evolution of TFP. Kukic´ (2017) finds that efficiency gains associated with structural modernisa-
tion can account for one-quarter of conventionally measured TFP gains in Yugoslavia. Further
explanations concerning the evolution of TFP are required.
Trade might, beyond boosting aggregate demand, indirectly impact output through TFP
(Alcala´ and Ciccone, 2004; Madsen, 2007). The gradual integration of Yugoslavia into global
markets (figure 1.a) might have stimulated TFP through three channels. First, by increasing
competitive pressures and hence stimulating domestic companies to improve their efficiency.
Second, by allowing the internationally small Yugoslav economy to realise economies of scale
by producing for foreign markets. Third, by facilitating the adoption of foreign knowledge.14
The previous interpretations focused on efficiency gains, neglecting possible technological
gains. DeLong and Summers (1991) argue that machinery and equipment investment has strong
association with growth. Since equipment embodies technology, equipment investment might
be positively associated with growth through TFP. Moreover, Caselli and Wilson (2004) provide
evidence that the composition of equipment influences TFP, since different types of equipment
embody different intensities of research and development (R&D), and hence technology. As a
13During the 1970s, the sectorial marginal product gap was reduced by 4 per cent on an average annual basis,
while in the 1950s and the 1960; it was reduced by 2.5 and 1 per cent, respectively (table 2).
14Starting in the 1960s, the development of tourism along the Adriatic coast is an illuminative example that
Yugoslavia, to an extent, did specialize in the production of goods and services according to its comparative
advantage (Allcock, 1986). This may have boosted TFP as long as it caused efficiency improvements and en-
hanced knowledge absorption. In addition to this, OECD trade in Yugoslav GDP has sharply increased following
Yugoslavia’s accession to the GATT in 1966 (see figure 1.a). Trade might have thus (partially) sustained TFP
gains during the 1960s and the 1970s. That is, as long as the entry into the GATT realigned Yugoslav resources
to more productive uses through increased trade with the OECD club, as opposed to the more autarkic socialist
system.
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Figure 4: Equipment investment and composition of equipment imports, Yugoslavia
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Note: It is not possible to identify the import categories of equipment before the early 1960s.
proxy for possible technological gains, I examine equipment investment as percentage of GDP
and the composition of equipment investment. As a proxy for the composition of equipment
investment, I examine the composition of equipment imports. Yugoslav trade statistics allow
me to differentiate between electrical equipment, non-electrical equipment, trucks, and other
vehicles. In the Caselli and Wilson (2004) dataset, electrical machinery is characterized by
higher R&D intensity than other types of equipment I can identify. Figure 4.a shows that
equipment investment as percentage of GDP increased since the mid-1960s until the late 1970s.
Figure 4.b shows that imports of electrical machinery as percentage of total machinery imports
increased as well. Conjecturally, both figures suggest that increased adoption rate of technology
sustained TFP gains during at least the 1970s.
Turning to the 1980s, can technology explain the stagnation of TFP? Broadberry and Klein
(2011) argue that Eastern European economies performed relatively well in an era of mass pro-
duction during the 1950s and the 1960s. They were, however, unable to achieve satisfactory
productivity performance with the onset of flexible production technology in the late 1970s and
the 1980s. Equipment investment, embodying flexible production technologies (like informa-
tion and communication technologies), did precipitously decrease since the late 1970s.15 This,
15The absolute value of electrical machinery has precipitously declined, too, although its share in total ma-
chinery imports has increased (figure 4.b). For instance, between 1981 and 1985, collapsing domestic demand
and severe austerity measures caused a 25 per cent decline of the nominal value of electrical machinery, even
though output prices increased by a factor of five during the same period.
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Figure 5: Crude oil imports as percentage of output, nominal values, Yugoslavia, 1952-89
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Notes: Output is Social Product (SP), the socialist equivalent of GDP. Discussion of SP is provided in
appendix A.1.
Sources: Crude oil imports and nominal SP are taken from SGJ (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1991) and
Jugoslavija 1918-1988: Statisticˇki Godiˇsnjak (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1989).
however, seems to be related to a deep crisis that was instigated by the second oil shock in
1979. During the 1970s, with available cheap capital in global financial markets, total external
debt level increased by nearly eight times, rendering Yugoslavia vulnerable to external shocks
(Dyker, 1990). External shocks came in two closely related forms.
First, the 1979 Iranian Revolution rattled the global energy markets (Hamilton, 2013).
Figure 5 plots crude oil imports as percentage of Yugoslavia’s output. The 1979 oil shock, as
well as the 1973 oil shock, is associated with a sharp increase in this figure. Yugoslavia was
particularly vulnerable to energy shocks because it was using two to three times more energy
per unit of output than the OECD countries during the early 1980s (Dyker, 1990). The second
oil shock was brought about by increased interest rates in creditor nations designed to reduce
inflation, increasing Yugoslavia’s debt-servicing costs.
The two combined effects led to a sharp increase in the current account deficit. In just one
year, 1978-79, it increased by a factor of three (Dyker, 1990). With constrained export demand,
the only way to avoid a crushing balance-of-payments crisis was to limit other components
of aggregate demand. From 1979 to 1983, severe austerity measures resulted in a collapse of
real personal incomes by approximately 30 per cent, and a precipitous fall in the investment to
output ratio (figure 2.b). Aggregate demand collapsed, and did not recover during the remainder
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Table 3: Capacity utilisation rate in Yugoslav man-
ufacturing, in per cent, 1977-89
Year Capacity utilisation
1977 81
1978 81
1979 81
1980 80
1981 80
1982 77
1983 77
1984 78
1985 77
1986 77
1987 76
1988 75
1989 75
Notes: Capacity utilization rate is an official esti-
mate of feasible output, according to initial design,
if factories were operating at full capacity, given
capital and labor. Estimates prior to 1977 are un-
available. The level at the beginning at the sample
period seems internationally comparable. For in-
stance, the 1967-2015 U.S. average of capacity uti-
lization is 80 per cent (Federal Reserve Bank of ST.
Louis, online).
Sources: SGJ (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1978-
1990).
of the 1980s.
Recessions are typically characterized by decreased capacity utilisation of both capital and
labour. If not explicitly accounted for, this would be otherwise reflected in declining TFP
(Paquet and Robidoux, 2001). Table 3 shows that capacity utilisation had decreased during the
1980s. The declining utilisation rate seems to have been driven by work stoppages and labour
unrest that dramatically increased during the 1980s (table 4). By contrast, hours worked by
engines in plants have increased during the 1980s, according to official sources (SGJ (Savezni
Zavod za Statistiku, 1978-1991)). This indicates that firm management attempted to substitute
capital for labour to combat declining capacity utilisation.
5.2 Capital wedge
The Yugoslav capital wedge was stable until the late 1970s (figure 3.b). Afterwards, it rapidly
decreased. This means that the incentive to save and invest remained stable before decreasing
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Table 4: Work stoppages in Yugoslavia, 1958-89
Frequency of strikes* Number of strikes Number of workers on strike Media reports of strikes
1958 2.8 n/a n/a n/a
1978 30 n/a n/a n/a
1980 62 235 13,504 3
1981 47 216 13,507 8
1982 18 174 10,997 24
1983 96 336 21,776 36
1984 100 393 29,031 86
1985 104 696 60,062 158
1986 163 851 88,860 195
1987 227 1685 288,686 734
1988 228 n/a n/a 320
1989 232 n/a n/a n/a
Note: *1980 to 1989 shows data for Slovenia, a member republic of Yugoslavia.
Sources: Stanojevic´ (2003) for the frequency of strikes; Jovanov (1989) for the number of strikes and the
number of workers involved; Lowinger (2009) for media reporting of strikes.
during the late 1970s. In contrast, the Southern European capital wedges increased during the
1980s. To an extent, the relative retardation of Yugoslav economic performance during the
1980s seems to have been caused by diverging capital wedges.
The transition from a centralised provision of capital to a more market-oriented one based
on investment auctions during the 1950s does not seem to be reflected in an increase of the
capital wedge. Nevertheless, to examine this transition period in greater depth, it is necessary
to include the period of central-planning into the analysis (1945-1951). This is unfortunately
impossible given the absence of reliable data for the period. Otherwise, one can only surmise
that the relegation of investment decisions from central planners to other economic agents
stimulated the accumulation of capital.
The introduction of banks as an important financial intermediary in 1965, the scrapping of
the fixed charge on the usage of capital, as well as the devolution of investment decisions to
labour-managed firms, seems to be reflected in a slight increase of the capital wedge.
Similar to the evolution of TFP, the 1979 oil shock is a major turning point for the evolution
of the capital wedge. The economy did encounter diminishing returns on capital since the
early 1960s (figure 6). However, the decrease of MPK is gradual and modest. The evolution
of MPK cannot explain the sharp deterioration of the capital wedge since the late 1970s in
figure 1.b. Rather, it seems that the macroeconomic instability of Yugoslavia, characterized
by high and persistent inflation (Frenkel and Taylor, 1993), had increased the preference to
consume in the present rather than in future, causing a deterioration of the capital wedge.
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Figure 6: Marginal product of capital in Yugoslavia and sample countries, 1952-89
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In addition, the sovereign debt crisis of the 1980s hampered access to credit (Dyker, 1990).
This should be reflected in deteriorating capital wedge, because smoothing consumption and
financing investment became more difficult.
5.3 Labour wedge
Yugoslav labour wedge initially deteriorated during the 1950s, but had stabilized by 1965 (figure
3.c).16 Subsequently, it persistently decreased. If Yugoslavia was characterized by embedded
disincentives that furthermore intensified over time, they are reflected in the deterioration of
the labour wedge. The incentive or ability of households to supply labour deteriorated over
time.
According to figure 3.c, the steady deterioration of the labour wedge during the post-war
period is not unique to Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, unlike in Yugoslavia, the labour wedges of
Portugal, Spain and the U.S. have rebounded during the mid-1980s. The beginning of the
steady deterioration of Yugoslavia’s labour wedge coincides with the socio-economic reforms of
1965. Although labour-managed firms were formally established in 1950, they did not operate
16The initial decline of the labor wedge is explained by the existence of subsistence consumption in appendix
A.3.4.
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freely outside government control until 1965 (Sapir, 1980; Estrin, 1983). The 1965 reforms,
as mentioned in section 2, provided almost complete autonomy to labour-managed firms to
distribute their net income between wages and investment.
A large group of scholars argue that labour-managed firms were maximising income per
worker (Ward, 1958; Vanek, 1970; Meade, 1972; Estrin, 1983). Moreover, their governing ob-
jective was reinforced by the 1965 reforms (Vanek and Jovicˇic´, 1975; Sapir, 1980). Figure
7 demonstrates that labour-managed firms were indeed attempting to maximise income per
worker. Real hourly wages divided by the marginal product of labour (MPL) (figure 7.a) and
by TFP (figure 7.b) had dramatically increased in Yugoslavia since 1965.17 This implies that
the governing objective of labour-managed firms raised the wage rate above its market clearing
level, preventing households from satisfying their condition for the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between consumption and leisure, causing the deterioration of the labour wedge. A similar
spike in real wages coincides with the deterioration of the Greek, Portuguese and Spanish labour
wedges during the 1970s, corroborating the importance of real wages in driving the evolution
of the labour wedge.
The evolution of real wages in Yugoslavia does not appear sufficient in explaining the de-
terioration of the labour wedge since the late 1970s. Real wages had dramatically declined.
Further mechanisms linking the behaviour of the labour-managed firm to the evolution of the
labour wedge are required.
The governing objective of labour-managed firms was partially achieved through restricting
new labour entry into existing firms (Milenkovitch, 1971; Sapir, 1980). Even though real wages
had collapsed during the 1980s, existing workers were able to capture a larger share of the
wage bill than it would have been possible if entry of labour into existing labour-managed
firms were not restricted. This behaviour resembles insider-outsider models of labour markets
characterized by strong trade unions.
The tendency of labour-managed firms to restrict employment is theoretically well grounded
(Ward, 1958; Meade, 1972). Allowing free establishment of firms could have alleviated such
distortion. This was not possible since the local government decided whether to allow an
establishment of a firm within its administrative boundaries (Horvat, 1971). Furthermore,
17The rationale of dividing wages by the MPL follows from the standard first order condition of the firm of
equating wages with the MPL. However, workers in Yugoslav labour-managed were appropriating capital rent,
and their income depended partially on the capital to labour ratio (Vanek and Jovicˇic´, 1975). As such, dividing
wages by TFP might be a better indicator of the extent to which workers managed to maximise their incomes.
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Figure 7: Hourly real wage rates divided by marginal product of labour (MPL) and TFP,
Yugoslavia and sample countries
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Note: Real wages are wage rates in manufacturing, in order to ensure comparability of series among the
sample-countries.
Sources: For Yugoslavia: SGJ (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1952-1991); for Greece, Portugal and Spain:
Mitchell (2013); for U.S.: BLS (online).
access to finance was limited (Prout, 1985). Banks were founded and owned by existing firms.
It is unlikely that an established firm would be willing to finance a new potential competitor
through a proxy.
The restriction of labour mobility is reflected in a sharp decrease in the job separation rate
(figure 8.c) and the job finding rate (figure 8.d) in the immediate aftermath of the 1965 reforms.
The ability of Yugoslavs to supply labour was severely limited due to the governing objective of
labour-managed firms, causing further deterioration of the labour wedge. This was subsequently
magnified by the macroeconomic instability instigated by the 1979 oil shock.
The decrease of the job finding rate after 1965 is not immediately reflected in either the
actual unemployment rate (figure 8.a) or the natural rate of unemployment (figure 8.b) due to
emigration of labour. With the elimination of travel restrictions in 1966, a large fraction of
labour moved to West Europe in search for higher wages (about 10 per cent) (Lampe, 2000).
This drained the domestic supply of labour, possibly causing further worsening of the labour
wedge. To speculate, it is possible that friends and relatives of emigrants that stayed in the
country were willing to decrease their labour supply because of the massive influx of remittances.
Between 1966 and 1989, remittances could fund, on average, about 15 per cent of the expenditure
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Figure 8: Labour market dynamics in Yugoslavia, 1960-90
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Notes: The data on labour market dynamics prior to 1960 is not available. The natural rate of un-
employment (U) is calculated as; U = s(s+f) , where the job separation rate (s) represents the fraction
of employed workers who lost their job in a particular year, while the job finding rate (f) represents
the fraction of unemployed people who were able to find a job within a particular year. Interestingly,
the natural rate of unemployment is higher than actual unemployment rate. This could be due to data
issues, but might further indicate disguised unemployment.
Sources: SGJ (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1961-1991).
side of the balance of payments position.18
5.4 Income wedge
The evolution of the income wedge (figure 3.d), has been shaped by net exports. Net ex-
ports have particularly deteriorated during the 1970s, driving the deterioration of the income
wedge. In 1969, I find that imports exceeded exports by 1 percentage point of GDP, while
in 1979, imports exceeded exports by 7 percentage points of GDP. As the country entered
the debt crisis, depressed domestic demand limited imports of both consumer and investment
goods. Furthermore, Dyker (1990) argues that imports of both consumer and investment goods
were deliberately decreased in order to mitigate a balance of payment crisis. Exports, given
constrained foreign demand, were promoted at any cost. Consequently, the current account
18SGJ (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1967-1990).
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Table 5: The contribution of wedges to the growth rate of selected macroe-
conomic variables in Yugoslavia, 1952-89
Output per capita Labour Capital to labour ratio Physical capital
1952-1960
Average annual Growth rate 5.4 -1.3 4.6 5.0
TFP 119% 408% -28% 466%
Capital wedge 33% -85% 33% -6%
Labour wedge 22% -454% 74% -12%
Income wedge 48% 77% 37% -98%
1960-1970
Average annual Growth rate 3.1 -7.1 6.2 4.2
TFP 132% -20% 71% 24%
Capital wedge 48% 7% 26% 19%
Labour wedge 6% -127% 74% -107%
Income wedge 71% 13% 40% 119%
1970-1980 0
Average annual Growth rate 3.5 -3.6 5.5 -1.4
TFP 151% 31% 109% -457%
Capital wedge 14% -111% 18% 786%
Labour wedge 11% -111% 36% -129%
Income wedge 89% 108% 47% -64%
1980-1989
Average annual Growth rate -1.4 -2.5 1.0 -12.8
TFP -29% -160% 490% -95%
Capital wedge 86% 120% -70% 82%
Labour wedge -64% -164% 130% -38%
Income wedge 36% -64% 80% -120%
Notes: The annual growth rates of selected macroeconomic variables is detrended by the labour-augmenting
technological progress. The table depicts the share of actual growth of a selected macroeconomic variable a
wedge can replicate, conditional on the other wedges remaining fixed.
position of Yugoslavia improved. For the first time in its history, exports exceeded imports by
1983, driving the improvement of the income wedge.19 The evolution of the income wedge im-
plies that the external shocks to the Yugoslav economic performance after 1979 were partially
positive. They caused a forceful restructuring of the balance of payments position, and the
structure of GDP.
6 Simulation results: The contribution of wedges to economic
growth
6.1 Baseline results
From the previous section, it is impossible to assess the quantitative contribution of each wedge
to economic growth. Table 5 displays the contribution of wedges to the average annual growth
rate of each macroeconomic variable of interest (output per capita, labour, capital to labour
ratio, and physical capital). The contribution of each wedge is isolated by holding constant the
value of all the remaining wedges to their average 1952-7 levels. The contribution of each wedge
reveals how much a variable of interest would have grown solely because of the evolution of that
wedge, relative to its realised or actual growth rate.
During the 1950s, TFP growth is able to replicate 119 per cent of realised economic growth
(first column of table 5). In the 1960s, the ability of TFP to replicate actual economic growth
19In 1986 as a record year, exports exceeded imports by 1.6 percentage points of GDP.
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increases to 136 per cent, and to 151 per cent during the 1970s. Thus, during these three
decades, economic growth would have been higher were all the other wedges fixed. During the
1980s, TFP would have made economic growth negative by a smaller degree were it not for
the evolution of the other wedges. The increasing importance of TFP in sustaining economic
growth during the Golden Age is reflected in the increasing contribution of TFP to the growth
rate of the capital to labour ratio (third column of table 5). TFP increased the steady state
level of output, while convergence towards the steady state was facilitated through an increase
in the capital to labour ratio.
The capital wedge stimulated growth in each decade, primarily through stimulating the
capital to labour ratio. The income wedge stimulated growth strongly during the 1970s and
the 1980s through increased net foreign demand for domestically produced goods and services.
Increased net foreign demand indirectly stimulated growth through increased demand for labour
(column 2 of table 5) and the capital to labour ratio.
The labour wedge was of minor importance in stimulating output between 1950 and 1980,
and it drove the retardation of economic performance during the 1980s. Throughout the sample
period, the labour wedge was a major constraint on growth through decreasing labour and
physical capital (fourth column of table 5).
Segmenting periods is a useful quantitative summary of results, but can obfuscate the dy-
namic dimension. The remainder of this section seeks to reinforce the two main findings of this
paper. First, that TFP became more important over time in sustaining growth. Second, that
the labour wedge was the most important constraint on growth.
Figure 9 plots the evolution of output per capita determined by all the wedges except TFP
(the line “without TFP”), in relation to the actual evolution of output per capita. The line
without TFP depicts simulated economic growth were TFP growth absent. The gap between
the two plotted lines is due to TFP.
Figure 9 reveals that in the early stages of growth (approximately until the early 1960s), the
path of the actual output and the counterfactual output track each other closely. This means
that the combined capital, labour and income wedge are able to replicate most of economic
growth. The gap between the two lines widens over time, meaning that TFP became more
important in sustaining growth with time.
To gauge further the relative significance of wedges, figure 10 estimates the marginal con-
tribution of each wedge to economic growth. It adds to the prototype model one at a time
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Figure 9: The actual evolution of GDP per capita versus the counterfactual evolution of it
(without TFP), 1952-89, Yugoslavia
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Note: If the two lines move in parallel, it means that the combined capital, labour and income wedges
are responsible for most of economic growth.
the capital wedge, TFP, the labour wedge, and the income wedge. The four wedges in tandem
match the data (the line “actual”). When the sequential addition of wedges makes the simu-
lated path of economic growth move more in tandem with the actual path of economic growth,
the newly added wedge is responsible for that movement.
The model that includes just the capital wedge systematically underestimates economic
growth since the late 1950s. Before, it generates a higher level of growth than implied by
data. When TFP is added to the model containing the capital wedge, the path of simulated
economic growth tracks the actual path closely. Thus, this model reconfirms that TFP became
gradually more important in sustaining economic growth. When the labour wedge is added to
the model containing the capital wedge and TFP, the simulated path of economic growth is
nearly identical to the actual path until 1965. Afterwards, the discrepancy between the actual
path of economic growth and the simulated path gradually widens (the discrepancy is due to
the remaining income wedge). This reconfirms that the labour wedge was a major constraint
on economic growth. The model with the capital wedge and TFP reinforces this finding. It
implies a higher level of GDP per capita than the data from the mid-1960s.
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Figure 10: Simulations of GDP per capita versus the actual movement, 1952-89, Yugoslavia
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6.2 Robustness checks
This section briefly reports the sensitivity of the baseline findings to alternative settings. I
reserve a detailed discussion of each robustness check to appendix A.3.
In appendix A.3, I experiment with the choice of parameters (coefficient for leisure, discount
factor, capital share, technological growth), functional forms (utility function with linear leisure,
and subsistence income), and other settings (exclusion of income wedge, alternative labour
data).20 The level of wedges can be highly sensitive to the choice of parameters - coefficient
for labour and capital share in particular. Other settings do not change the level of wedges
significantly compared to the baseline setting. The evolution of wedges, however, which is the
cornerstone of the analysis, remains largely unchanged across a variety of settings compared
20For parameters, I calculate the coefficient for leisure and the discount factor from the data. This exercise
yields the coefficient of leisure of 3.5 and the discount factor of 0.95 (identical to the baseline case). Capital
share effectively serves as weight on components of growth. To test the sensitivity of my results to the capital
share, I push the capital share to a lower and upper bound of plausibility, 0.3 and 0.5, respectively. Assuming a
constant growth rate of labour-augmenting technology might be inappropriate for Yugoslavia which experienced
growth regime changes. I test the sensitivity of my baseline findings to this parameter by setting it to zero.
Concerning functional forms, I experiment with alternative utility functions. I test the sensitivity of my baseline
findings to a utility function with linear leisure, which assigns a greater role to labour in driving the fluctuations of
macroeconomic variables. I also experiment with the Stone-Geary utility function, which accounts for the presence
of subsistence consumption. Concerning other settings, I exclude the income wedge, as it is questionable whether
demand shocks have a persistent impact on long-run output. Finally, I smooth average hours worked between
the initial year of analysis and the final year of analysis, as the data is characterized by a structural break in
average hours worked in 1965, which may or may not be a statistical artefact.
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to the baseline setting. In other words, different settings result in different wedge values, but
the trends and patterns remain qualitatively unchanged compared to the baseline case. The
results of this paper are therefore not driven by the choice of parameter values, functional forms,
and other settings. Under a variety of settings, TFP still gradually accounts for a larger share
of output growth. Labour wedge remains the main retarding factor of Yugoslavia’s economic
growth.
7 Conclusion
Until the late 1970s, TFP became incrementally more important in sustaining Yugoslavia’s
economic growth. TFP growth was likely sustained by the accelerated process of structural
modernisation; possibly by efficiency gains stemming from the gradual integration of Yugoslavia
into the global economy; and possibly by the increased adoption rate of technology. The stag-
nation of TFP during the 1980s, as well as the stagnation or decline of other macroeconomic
variables, is related to the deep crisis instigated by the 1979 oil shock. Even though TFP
stagnated, and decreased towards the end of the 1980s, it was of second-order importance in
causing Yugoslavia’s output retardation. Instead, the deterioration of the labour wedge is the
most important factor bringing Yugoslav economy to a stalemate. In turn, intensifying labour
distortions were caused by the greater devolution of economic power to labour-managed firms.
Yugoslavs were incentivized to undersupply labour domestically. They responded by supplying
labour abroad.
In sum, Yugoslav growth retardation has been caused by both internal and external factors.
On the internal side, labour-managed firms distorted labour incentives. On the external side,
the 1979 oil shock was the main culprit. These results are complementary to the recent work
of Vonyo´ (2017). He argues that the convergence of socialist Eastern Europe towards the
income levels of Western Europe was constrained by labour supply inflexibility induced by
WWII population loses. It is possible that this labour supply inflexibility interacted with
labour-managed firms to distort the ability of Yugoslavs to supply labour.
Given their capacity to embark on radical reforms during the early years, how come Yu-
goslavs were unable to reform their economy later on? Policy makers were aware of remedies,
but politics got into way. Dusˇan Bilandzˇic´, a historian and a politician, reports in his memoirs
that in 1970 the Central Committee of the CPY accepted draft proposals aimed at liberalising
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capital markets and entry of firms (Bilandzˇic´, 2006). The aim of these policies was to diminish
or eliminate the apparent labour distortions. However, these policies were abandoned with the
flaring of political and ethnic tensions by the 1971 calls for democracy in Croatia, a member
republic of Yugoslavia.
The inability of Yugoslavia to cope with the 1979 oil shock was compounded by a major
domestic shock. The lifelong president of Yugoslavia, Tito, died in 1980. He was replaced by
an ineffectual collective presidency containing nine members. They lacked political capital to
pursue planned reforms.
It is natural to wonder whether the findings of this article have wider implications. They
do. The recent growth slowdown of China has reinvigorated the debate about the viability of
state-led development strategies. The findings of this article can inform this debate. For that
matter, Yugoslavia was one of the initial reform models for Chinese policy-makers and their
incremental reforms that began in 1978 (Rozman, 2014). The experience of Yugoslavia implies
that, in a partially reformed economy, gradual elimination of distortions begets new distortions.
Agents that are freed from centralised control respond by exploiting rents in the unreformed
parts of the economy. One is left with taking a leap of faith in the omniscience and good
intention of planners.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data: Yugoslavia
A.1.1 GDP
Net Material Product, or Social Product (SP) in case of Yugoslavia, was the official metric of
output in socialist countries. SP is conceptually equivalent to GDP. Official estimates of the
output of socialist economies are however criticised. They are criticized due to index number
problems (Gerschenkron, 1947), distorted prices (Staller, 1986), and perhaps outright fabrication
by enterprises in order to maximise the allocation of scarce resources within a shortage economy.
For these reasons, I use alternative GDP series from Maddison (online). Maddison (online) used
the output series created by a group of Western scholars that were published in a series of papers
within the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, and led by Thad P.
Alton from Columbia University. They relied on physical output indicators published in official
sources that they transformed into GNP at factor cost. They relied on the method developed
by Bergson (1953) to estimate Soviet national income. They imputed the value of output by
estimating the returns to factors of production (labour, fixed capital, and agricultural land), and
then by multiplying these returns by the volume of factors of production. They consistently
applied western national accounting standards (System of National Accounts), making their
estimates comparable to output series of market economies. Their publications, covering the
whole period under analysis, include Alton (1970) and Alton, Badach, Bass, Bakondi, Brumaru,
Bombelles, Lazarcik, and Staller (1992). Their GDP dataset is largely considered to be the most
reliable one concerning socialist European countries. It is widely used in empirical research on
socialist economies in Europe. For recent examples, see e.g. Vonyo´ (2017) and Vonyo´ (2017).
It is worthwhile to note why I am not using the newest collection of GDP estimates by
Bolt and van Zanden (2014). They include the GDP estimates of Yugoslav successor states by
Branko Milanovic´. His aim was to produce comparable GDP levels of the successor states of
Yugoslavia. He has, however, projected their historical growth rates by official data (information
obtained through personal correspondence). Thus, in the Bolt and van Zanden (2014) dataset,
the economic growth rates of Yugoslavia are based on official estimates, which are inflated. As
such, I prefer to use the earlier Maddison (online) dataset, where growth rates are more reliable.
A.1.2 Gross investment, physical capital stock, and consumption
The most problematic data required for the analysis is gross investment. Similar to output,
gross investment was likely inflated due to price distortions (prices of producer goods were set
above world prices, while prices of agricultural goods were set below world prices), index number
problems, and perhaps outright fabrication from enterprises.21 While alternative output series
have been produced in response to the criticism of official output series, there are no existing
alternative investment series. As such, I embrace the data produced by government statisticians,
but make an adjustment using their own data. As mentioned in the body of the text, I exclude
an investment category called “other”. I have decided to omit this category since it includes
expenditure on product research and training of personnel, which is not part of physical capital.
Furthermore, it includes revaluation of inventory stock, while Madzˇar (1985) reports that, in
the presence of high inflation of the 1970 and the 1980s, these values have been inflated.
There are additional factors that distort the investment ratio. The existing literature typi-
cally imputes the investment ratio by dividing gross investment by SP. This is a grave mistake
that overestimates the investment ratio. Official gross investment includes all the sectors of the
economy, while the SP does not. The SP excludes the “non-productive sectors” - education,
21For example, under controlled prices and resource allocation, investment goods producers had an incentive
to increase output by degrading quality. This created the problem of hidden inflation (Bergson, 1987b).
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healthcare, culture, administration, housing, and finance. Government statisticians thought
these sectors did not contribute to the value-added of a socialist economy. This means, for
instance, that the so-constructed investment ratio includes education in the numerator, but not
in the denominator. This, naturally, magnifies the investment ratio. To solve this problem, I
divide investment by GDP, rather than by SP.
Another common problem in computing the investment ratio is to rely on data expressed
in current prices. This is misleading because investment was valued at the end of year, while
output was not. This magnifies the so-constructed investment ratio. To solve this valuation
problem, I rely on data expressed in constant 1972 prices, before converting it to 1990 Int.
GK$. Contextually, the newly constructed investment series do not seem particularly high, or
implausible (figure 2.c).
The initial level of capital stock is estimated using existing national wealth estimates. Vinski
(1978) has made a pivotal estimate of national wealth in Yugoslavia. He has used 1953 as the
benchmark year. He has relied on an official survey of physical capital in 1953, but extended
it to include a much greater array of physical capital. For instance, he estimated the value
of residential structures, which the government statisticians ignored. I initially estimate cap-
ital stock by type (equipment, residential structures, and non-residential structures) through
perpetual inventory method, given the initial value of capital. Subsequently, I aggregate the
capital stock types into a single series. Thus, I do not estimate the contribution of each physical
capital sub-input to economic growth. In the absence of a capital market, it is not possible to
estimate the rental prices of capital sub-inputs with which capital sub-inputs could be otherwise
weighted into a single capital aggregate and adjusted for “quality”.
In order to derive the level of consumption, I use the official annual consumption to output
ratio, and multiply it by Yugoslavia’s annual GDP provided by Maddison (online).
A.1.3 Population
Official data concerning population seems reliable. In the literature on Yugoslavia, or socialist
economies more generally, I have not encountered criticism concerning official population data.
I take annual estimates of the working-age population (15-64 years) from Vitalna Statistika
(1950-4) (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1950-1954) and Demografska Statistika (Savezni Zavod za
Statistiku, 1955-1989). Government statisticians have derived these estimates from population
censuses, given the fertility and mortality rates. It excludes labour that moved abroad.
Total labour is derived by multiplying the headcount of workers by average hours worked.
Yearly hours worked per average worker are defined as effective hours worked, e.g. excluding sick
leave but including overtime. These averages are taken from SGJ (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku,
1952-1991).
I take the human capital estimates from Kukic´ (2017). He estimates human capital for
the population that is actually employed, including agricultural labour. He estimates human
capital for benchmark years (1953, 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1986). For the remaining years of the
analysis, I linearly interpolate human capital. For 1987-9, human capital is extrapolated by its
average growth rate during 1981-6.
Figure 11 plots population-related data. The sharp decline in the labour to the working
age population ratio in figure 2.c in 1965 is driven by the sharp decline in labour (figure 11.a),
since the working age population has steadily increased throughout the sample period (figure
11.b). Over the whole period, labour has slightly decreased. This is driven by the decline in
average hours worked by 20 per cent during the post-war period (figure 11.c), since the amount
of workers has increased by 18 per cent during the sample period (figure 11.d). The decline in
average hours worked in 1965 is very sharp. As a robustness check, I assess whether this has
an implication concerning the estimated labour wedge in appendix A.3.5. I linearly interpolate
hours worked between the initial and final year, so as to smooth the evolution of average hours
worked. The baseline findings are unaltered.
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Figure 11: Population data, 1952-89, Yugoslavia
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A.2 Data: Greece, Portugal, Spain, and the U.S.
A.2.1 GDP
For Greece, Portugal, Spain, and the U.S.: GDP data in 1990 Int. GK$ is taken from Bolt and
van Zanden (2014).
A.2.2 Labour
For Greece, Portugal, Spain, and the U.S.: Data on the number of workers and average yearly
hours worked are taken from the Conference Board (Total Economy Database) (online).
A.2.3 Working-age Population (15-64 years)
For Greece, Portugal, Spain, and the U.S.: Working-age population is taken from the United
Nations (UN) - Department of Economic and Social Affairs (online). The data by the UN is
provided in five-year intervals. As such, the in-between years are linearly interpolated.
A.2.4 Human capital average years of schooling
For Greece, Portugal, Spain, and the U.S.: Data on average years of schooling is taken from
Barro and Lee (2013) for the working-age population. Their data is provided at five-year
intervals. As such, I linearly interpolate the remaining years.
A.2.5 Consumption, gross investments, and government expenditure
For Greece, Portugal, and Spain: Consumption and gross investment GDP shares are taken
from Penn World Table 8.1 (PWT.8.1) in Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015). These shares
are subsequently multiplied by Bolt and van Zanden (2014) GDP series to impute the value of
consumption and investment in 1990 Int. GK$.
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For the U.S.: Data is taken from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (online),
and deflated into 1990 Int. GK$ using the official U.S. output deflator.
A.2.6 Physical capital stock
For Greece: in the absence of long-run national wealth estimates, the physical capital is derived
from PWT.8.1 in Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015). The capital to output ratio for 1950
is taken from PWT.8.1 and multiplied by the GDP of Greece in Bolt and van Zanden (2014)
to impute the value of physical capital stock in 1990 Int. GK$.
For Portugal: Physical capital stock is derived from Silva and Lains (2013). They initialise
their series in 1910 using the steady state approach with 2006 euros. I convert these series into
1990 Int. GK$ through a few steps. First, I derive the capital to output ratio for 2006, where
GDP data for 2006 in current prices is taken from Statistics Portugal (online). Second, the
capital to output ratio derived is converted into 1990 Int. GK$ using the GDP series of Bolt
and van Zanden (2014). The value of physical capital for the years of the analysis is imputed
by applying the real growth rates of physical capital of Silva and Lains (2013) to the capital to
output ratio in 1990 Int. GK$.
For Spain: Physical capital stock is derived from Prados de la Escosura and Rose´s (2010).
They initialise the physical capital in 1850 using the steady state approach. I multiply their
capital to output ratio by the GDP series of Bolt and van Zanden (2014) to derive physical
capital in 1990 Int. GK$.
For U.S.: Physical capital stock is taken from the BEA (online) - fixed assets and consumer
durable goods net of government.
A.3 Robustness checks
A.3.1 Absolute level of wedges of baseline case (figure 3), and general comments
This section shows the absolute level of wedges of the baseline case (figure 3) in figure 12.
The absolute levels of wedges should be interpreted with caution. Each wedge is calculated
relative to the frictionless steady state of the analysed country. Thus, the levels of wedges are
conditioned by TFP, investment rate, and the like. As these factors vary among countries,
it is very difficult, if not meaningless, to interpret differences in the levels of wedges between
countries.
Moreover, as shown in a variety of robustness checks below, the level of wedges can be
highly sensitive to the choice of parameters (coefficient for leisure, discount factor, capital share,
technological growth) functional forms (utility function with linear leisure, and subsistence
income), and other settings (exclusion of income wedge, alternative labour data). The broad
evolution of wedges, however, remains largely unchanged compared to the baseline case. In
other words, different settings result in different wedge values, but the trends and patterns
remain qualitatively unchanged compared to the baseline case. TFP still gradually accounts
for a larger share of output. Labor wedge remains the main retarding factor of Yugoslavia’s
growth.
Each robustness check below reports the relative and absolute level of wedges. Then, each
robustness check assesses the sensitivity of the baseline simulation results to different settings
by replicating figures 9 and 10 of the main text.
A.3.2 Country-specific coefficient for leisure and discount factor
This robustness check constructs β and φ from the data for each sample-country. If the results
are similar to the baseline case, then the baseline choice of these two parameters is not driving
the results of the paper.
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Figure 12: Yugoslav and sample-countries wedges, absolute levels, baseline case, 1952-89
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To estimate φ for each sample-country, labour wedge is assumed to be equal to 1 in equation
8 for 1990, the terminating period. If so, then:
φ = (1− l1990)
(1− θ)y1990l1990
c1990
(11)
This exercise yields: Yugoslav φ: 3.5; Greek φ: 1.8; Portuguese φ: 1.6; Spanish φ: 3.1; U.S.: φ:
1.6.
Similar to the coefficient for leisure, to estimate β from the data, the capital wedge is
assumed to be equal to 1 in equation 9 for year 1990, the terminating period. If so, then:
β =
1 + γ
1 + θ y1990k1990 − δ
(12)
This exercise yields: Yugoslav β: 0.95; Greek β: 0.98; Portuguese β: 0.94; Spanish β: 0.94;
U.S. β: 0.90.
Figure 13 plots the wedges as in the baseline case of figure 3. The discount factor and the
coefficient for leisure affect the levels of wedges, particularly the labour wedge (figure 14), but
not the evolution of wedges. Thus as mentioned before, it makes more sense to interpret trends
rather than levels. Since the analysis of the growth rates is the cornerstone of the analysis, the
baseline results remain robust.
Figures 15 and 16 replicate the simulation exercises of the baseline case, but using the
newly estimated parameters. Figures 15 and 16 are indistinguishable from figures 9 and 10 of
the baseline case.
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Figure 13: Yugoslav and sample-countries wedges, relative levels, country-specific coefficient for
leisure and discount factor, 1952-89
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A.3.3 Utility function with linear leisure
In order to assess the sensitivity of the findings of this paper (labour wedge in particular) to the
choice of the baseline utility function, I use an alternative utility function with linear leisure.
That is: ∞∑
t=0
βtNt[log(ct) + φ(1− lt)] (13)
This utility function assigns a greater role to labour in driving the fluctuations of macroeconomic
variables.
Figure 17 plots the wedges as in the baseline case of figure 3. Introduction of linear leisure
affects the level of the labour wedges (figure 18), but not its evolution. Hence, the baseline
results for Yugoslavia remain robust.
Figures 19 and 20 replicate the simulation exercises of the baseline case, but using the utility
function with linear leisure. The results remain robust. Figures 19 and 20 seem identical to
figures 9 and 10 of the baseline case. However, the simulated output paths seem to fluctuate to
a larger extent, reflecting the greater weight assigned to the fluctuations of labour.
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Figure 14: Yugoslav and sample-countries wedges, absolute levels, country-specific coefficient
for leisure and discount factor, 1952-89
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Figure 15: The actual evolution of GDP per capita versus the counterfactual evolution of it
(without TFP), country-specific coefficient for leisure and discount factor, 1952-89
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Figure 16: Simulations of GDP per capita versus the actual GDP per capita, country-specific
coefficient for leisure and discount factor, 1952-89
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A.3.4 Stone-Geary utility function
The existence of subsistence income levels might affect the estimated wedges. In developing
countries, due to subsistence levels, individuals might in effect have less choice in the allocation
of time between work (consumption) and leisure. Subsistence needs might exhaust a large share
of their household expenditure. To deal with this issue, I use the Stone-Geary utility function:
∞∑
t=0
βtNt[log(ct − c¯t) + φlog(1− lt)] (14)
where c¯t denotes subsistence level, which is fixed. In order to estimate the subsistence level
from the data, I assume the labour wedge is equal to one in the first five years of the analysis,
thus:
c¯t = ct −
((1− θ)ytlt )(1− lt)
φ
(15)
Figure 21 displays the wedges. Compared to the baseline case of figure 3, the labour wedges
tend to be more stable in the beginning of the sample. For Yugoslavia, the initial decline of
the labour wedge in the 1950s is quite small. Thus, the existence of subsistence income can
explain the initial decline of the labour wedge, which reinforces one of the main conclusions of
this paper that the Yugoslav labour wedge embarked on a steady decline since 1965.
However, inclusion of subsistence levels changes the dynamics of the labour wedge in Greece
and Portugal quite a bit. In case of Greece, the decline of the labour wedge since the late 1950s
is much smoother, while the Portuguese labour seems to have actually improved between the
start of the sample-period and the mid-1970s, before experiencing a sharp decline. As expected,
the U.S. labour wedge is not impacted by the existence of subsistence levels..
Figures 23 and 24 replicate the simulation exercises of the baseline case, but using the
Stone-Geary utility function. The baseline results concerning Yugoslavia remain robust.
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Figure 17: Yugoslav and sample-countries wedges, relative levels, utility function with linear
leisure, 1952-89
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A.3.5 Alternative labour data: linearly interpolated average yearly hours worked
Here I assess the sensitivity of the labour wedge to average hours worked. Hours worked
embarked on a sharp downward trend since 1965, which might be a statistical artefact. To
assess the sensitivity of the results to this movement, I smooth the Yugoslav average hours
worked by linearly interpolating them between the initial year of the analysis, 1952, and the
final year of the analysis, 1989. I do not change hours worked for other sample countries.
Figure 25 presents the wedges. Compared to the baseline case, the decline in the labour
wedge is less sharp since 1965, but is still pronounced and steady. The initial level of wedges is
identical to the baseline case (figure 26).
Figures 27 and 28 replicate the simulation exercises of the baseline case but using linearly
interpolated hours. The sharp decline in average yearly hours worked since 1965 does not seem
to have a substantial bearing concerning the baseline findings.
A.3.6 Without income wedge
The income wedge measures demand “shocks”. It is questionable whether demand has a persis-
tent impact on long-run output. Furthermore, the income wedge, or at least components of it,
is likely endogenous to the other wedges. Here I exclude the income wedge, and assess whether
my baseline findings remain robust.
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Figure 18: Yugoslav and sample-countries wedges, absolute levels, utility function with linear
leisure, 1952-89
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Figure 19: The actual evolution of GDP per capita versus the counterfactual evolution of it
(without TFP), utility function with linear leisure, 1952-89
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Figure 20: Simulations of GDP per capita versus the actual GDP per capita, utility function
with linear leisure, 1952-89
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Figure 29 depicts the evolution of wedges, without the income wedge. Figures 31 and
32 recreate the simulation exercises of the baseline case. The initial level of the labor wedge
decreases compared to the baseline case (figure 30). In figure 31 the contribution of TFP is much
greater than in the baseline case. Without the income wedge, the labour wedge is counteracting
the positive contribution of the capital wedge to economic growth (the line “without TFP” in
graph 31).
From figure 32 it is hard to determine the impact of the labour wedge on growth. To visualize
the contribution of the labour wedge more explicitly, in figure 33 I isolate the contribution of
each wedge to growth by holding the other wedges fixed. Figure 33 makes it clear that the
labour wedge remains the major constraint on growth with the exclusion of the income wedge.
If all the other wedges remained fixed, labour wedge would have made GDP per capita only
barely higher at the end of the period, compared to the beginning of the period. Thus, the
baseline results remain robust to the exclusion of the income wedge.
A.3.7 Without trend growth rate of labour-augmenting technology
Because I have included the trend growth rate of labour-augmenting technological progress in
the simulation exercises, the baseline model focuses on accounting for fluctuations of economic
growth around its trend. That is, it makes a distinction between a balanced-growth path, and
the accelerations or decelerations of growth around that path. Since Yugoslavia experienced
growth regime changes, assuming a constant growth rate of technology might be inappropriate.
As a robustness check, I exclude the trend growth rate, and assess the sensitivity of the
baseline results. I do not show the evolution of wedges here since the baseline case already
excluded the trend growth rate of technology, in order to make TFP comparable to standard
growth accounting exercises. Figures 34 and 35 recreate the simulation exercises of the baseline
case, but setting the trend growth rate of technology to zero. Note that the evolution of wedges
in both figures is similar to the baseline case. However, TFP of this section seems to account
for a larger share of growth than in the baseline case. Note also that since macroeconomic
variables are no longer detrended by a constant rate of technological gains, the actual growth
rate of GDP per capita is also higher than in the baseline case.
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Figure 21: Yugoslav and sample-countries wedges, relative levels, Stone-Geary utility function,
1952-89
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A.3.8 Capital shares
The capital share is a critical component determining the percentage contributions of physical
and human capital to growth. Therefore, I examine how different values of capital share affect
the results of this paper. I change the capital share only for Yugoslavia.
I examine two scenarios. I push the capital share to a lower and an upper bound of plau-
sibility (0.3 and 0.5). Then, I assess whether these exercises can overturn the results of the
paper. These exercises clearly have a bearing on the proportion of output explicable by TFP.
But, the main result concerning TFP remains robust. TFP gradually accounted for a larger
share of output, and did not drive the growth retardation of the 1980s.
A.3.8.1 Capital share: 0.3
In this section, I decrease the capital share to a lower bound of plausibility, 0.3. Figure 36
depicts the new trend of wedges, while figure 37 depicts the new level of wedges. TFP growth
rate is now higher. The level of TFP is higher, too. Therefore, decreasing the capital share of
output increases both the share of output growth and the level of output that can be attributed
to TFP. This reinforces one of the finding of the paper that TFP did not drive the retardation
of Yugoslav growth.
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Figure 22: Yugoslav and sample-countries wedges, absolute levels, Stone-Geary utility function,
1952-89
Year
1952 1960 1970 1980 1989
N
o 
fri
ct
io
ns
 (b
en
ch
ma
rk 
mo
de
l) =
 10
0
40
80
100
140
180
220
Panel a: TFP
Year
1952 1960 1970 1980 1989
N
o 
fri
ct
io
ns
 (b
en
ch
ma
rk 
mo
de
l) =
 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
Panel b: Capital wedges
Year
1952 1960 1970 1980 1989
N
o 
fri
ct
io
ns
 (b
en
ch
ma
rk 
mo
de
l) =
 1
0.5
1
1.5
2
Panel c: Labor wedges
Year
1952 1960 1970 1980 1989
As
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 G
DP
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Panel d: Income wedges
Yugoslavia Greece Portugal Spain U.S.
But, it is unclear whether decreasing the capital share has a bearing on the finding that
TFP gradually accounted for a larger fraction of economic growth. Figure 38 and 39 show that
TFP still gradually accounts for a larger fraction of economic growth when using a lower capital
share. However, it seems that with a lower capital share, the fall of TFP towards the end of
the 1980s is more pronounced compared to the baseline case.
A.3.8.2 Capital share: 0.5
In this section, I push the capital share to the upper range of plausibility, 0.5. Figure 40 depicts
the new trend of wedges, while figure 41 depicts the new level of wedges. Increasing the capital
share reduces the share of output growth than can be attributed to TFP (figure 40). It also
decreases the level of output that can be attributed to TFP (figure 41). This does not overturn
the main results of the paper. TFP still gradually accounts for a larger fraction of output
growth over time (figures 42 and 43).
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Figure 23: The actual evolution of GDP per capita versus the counterfactual evolution of it
(without TFP), Stone-Geary utility function, 1952-89
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Figure 24: Simulations of GDP per capita versus the actual GDP per capita, Stone-Geary utility
function, 1952-89
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Figure 25: Yugoslav and sample-countries wedges, relative levels, alternative labour data, 1952-
89
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Figure 26: Yugoslav and sample-countries wedges, absolute levels, alternative labour data,
1952-89
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Figure 27: The actual evolution of GDP per capita versus the counterfactual evolution of it
(without TFP), alternative labour data, 1952-89
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Figure 28: Simulations of GDP per capita versus the actual GDP per capita, alternative labour
data, 1952-89
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Figure 29: Yugoslav and sample-countries wedges, relative levels, without income wedge, 1952-
89
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Figure 30: Yugoslav and sample-countries wedges, absolute levels, without income wedge, 1952-
89
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Figure 31: The actual evolution of GDP per capita versus the counterfactual evolution of it
(without TFP), without income wedge, 1952-89
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Figure 32: Simulations of GDP per capita versus the actual GDP per capita, without income
wedge, 1952-89
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Figure 33: Simulations of GDP per capita versus the actual GDP capita, the contribution of
each wedge, without income wedge, 1952-89
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Figure 34: The actual evolution of GDP per capita versus the counterfactual evolution of it
(without TFP), without trend growth rate of labour-augmenting technology, 1952-89
1952 1960 1970 1980 1989
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Year
In
de
x,
 1
95
2=
10
0,
 lo
g 
sc
al
e
 
 
Without TFP Actual
Figure 35: Simulations of GDP per capita versus the actual GDP per capita, without trend
growth rate of labour-augmenting technology, 1952-89
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Figure 36: Yugoslav and sample-countries wedges, relative levels, capital share: 0.3, 1952-89
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Figure 37: Yugoslav and sample-countries wedges, absolute levels, capital share: 0.3, 1952-89
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Figure 38: The actual evolution of GDP per capita versus the counterfactual evolution of it
(without TFP), capital share: 0.3 1952-89
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Figure 39: Simulations of GDP per capita versus the actual GDP per capita, capital share: 0.3
1952-89
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Figure 40: Yugoslav and sample-countries wedges, relative levels, capital share: 0.5, 1952-89
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Figure 41: Yugoslav and sample-countries wedges, absolute levels, capital share: 0.5, 1952-89
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Figure 42: The actual evolution of GDP per capita versus the counterfactual evolution of it
(without TFP), capital share: 0.5, 1952-89
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Figure 43: Simulations of GDP per capita versus the actual GDP per capita, capital share: 0.5,
1952-89
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